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Abstract. Crime is an economically important activity, sometimes called the “industry of crime”. It may
represent a mechanism of wealth distribution but also a social and economic charge because of the cost
of the law enforcement system. Sometimes it may be less costly for the society to allow for some level of
criminality. A drawback of such policy may lead to a high increase of criminal activity that may become
hard to reduce. We investigate the level of law enforcement required to keep crime within acceptable limits
and show that a sharp phase transition is observed as a function of the probability of punishment. We
also analyze the growth of the economy, the inequality in the wealth distribution (the Gini coefficient) and
other relevant quantities under different scenarios of criminal activity and probability of apprehension.
PACS. 89.65-s Social and economic systems – 89.65.Ef Social organizations; anthropology – 89.65.Gh
Economics; econophysics
1 Introduction
Crime is a human activity probably older than the crudely
called “oldest profession”. Criminal activity may have many
different causes: envy, like in the case of Cain and Abel [1],
jealousy like in the opera Carmen, or financial gain like Ja-
cob cheating Esau with the lentil pottage (and his father
with the lamb skin) to obtain the birthright [2]. This is
to say that crime can have many different causes, some of
them “passional”, sometimes “logical” or “rational” [3].
All along history, organized societies have tried to pre-
vent and to deter criminality through some kind of pun-
ishment. In all the societies and all the times punishment
has been in some way proportional to the gravity of the
offense. Methods ranged from the lex talionis “an eye for
an eye”, to fines, imprisonment, and the death penalty.
Most of the literature on crime considered criminals as de-
viant individuals. Usual explanations of why people offend
use concepts like insanity, depravity, anomia, etc. In 18th
Century England criminals were massively “exported” to
Australia because it was thought that the criminal condi-
tion was hereditary and incurable: incapacitation was the
solution.
In any case the increase of criminal activity in differ-
ent countries have led some sectors of the population, as
well as politicians, to ask for harder penalties. The un-
derstated idea is that a hard sentence, besides incapacita-
tion of convicted criminals, would have a deterrent effect
on other possible offenders and would also prevent recidi-
vism. Yet, the deterrent effect of punishment is a polemic
subject and law experts diverge with respect to whether
offenders should be rehabilitated or simply punished (see
for example the recent public discussion in France [4]).
In many countries, incapacitation is the main reason for
imprisonment of criminals. For instance the Argentinean
constitution states that prisons are not there for the pun-
ishment of the inmates but for the security of the society:
criminals are isolated, not punished [5].
Although the idea that the decision of committing a
crime results from a trade off between the expected profit
and the risk of punishment dates back to the eighteen
and nineteenth centuries, it is only recently that crime
modeling emerged as a field worth of being investigated.
In a review paper, Alfred Blumstein [6] traces back the
recent interest in crime modeling to 1966, when the USA
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Admin-
istration of Justice created a Task Force on Science and
Technology. Composed mainly by engineers and scientists,
its aim was to introduce simulation modeling of the Ameri-
can criminal justice system. The model allowed to evaluate
the resource requirements and costs associated to a crim-
inal case, from arrest to release, by considering the flow
through the justice system. For example, it estimated the
opportunity of incarceration of convicted criminals and
ar
X
iv
:0
71
0.
37
51
v1
  [
nli
n.A
O]
  1
9 O
ct 
20
07
2 Mirta B. Gordon et al.: Crime and punishment: the economic burden of impunity
the length of the incarceration time. In his concluding re-
marks, Blumstein states that: “We are still not fully clear
on the degree to which the deterrent and incapacitation ef-
fects of incarceration are greater than any criminalization
effects of the incarceration, and who in particular can be
expected to have their (tendency to)1 crime reduced and
who might be made worse by the punishment”.
In a now classical article G. Becker [7] presents for
the first time an economic analysis of costs and benefits
of crime, with the aim of developing optimal policies to
combat illegal behavior. Considering the social loss from
offenses, which depends on their number and on the pro-
duced harm, the cost of aprehension and conviction and
the probability of punishment per offense, the model tries
to determine how many offenses should be permitted and
how many offenders should go unpunished, through min-
imization of the social loss function.
Using a similar point of view, Ehrlich [8,9] develops an
economic theory to explain participation in illegitimate ac-
tivities. He assumes that a person’s decision to participate
in an illegal activity is motivated by the relation between
cost and gain, or risks and benefits, arising from such ac-
tivity. The model seemed to provide strong empirical evi-
dence of the deterrent effectiveness of sanctions. However,
according to Blumstein [6] the results “... were sufficiently
complex that the U.S. Justice Department called on the
National Academy of Sciences to convene a panel to as-
sess the validity of the Erlich results. The report of that
panel highlighted the sensitivity of these econometric mod-
els to details of the model specification, to the particular
time series of the data used, and to the sensitivity of the
instrumental variable used for identification, and so called
into question the validity of the results”. In fact, the issue
of what constitutes an optimal crime control policy is still
controversial.
Another controversial subject is the relationship be-
tween raising of income inequality and victimization. Becker’s
economic model of crime would suggest that as income
distribution becomes wider, the richer become increas-
ingly attractive targets to the poorer. There are many
reasons why this hypothesis may not be correct. For ex-
ample, Deutsch et al. [10] consider the impact of wealth
distribution on crime frequency and, contrary to the gen-
eral consensus in the literature, conclude that variations of
the wealth differences between “rich” and “poor” do not
explain variations in the rates of crime. Bourguignon et al
[11] based on data from seven Colombian cities conclude
that in crime modeling the average income of the pop-
ulation determines the expected gain, but that potential
criminals belong to the segment of the population whose
income is below 80% of the mean. More recently, Dahlberg
and Gustavsson [12] pointed out that in crime statistics
one should distinguish between permanent and transitory
incomes. Disentangling these income components based
on tax reports in Sweden, they find that an increase in in-
equality in permanent income (measured through the vari-
ance of the distribution) yields a positive and significant
effect on crime rates, while an increase in the inequality
1 We added these words in parenthesis
due to a transitory income has no significant effect. Levitt
[13] concludes from empirical data that, probably because
rich people engage in behavior that reduces their victim-
ization, the trends between 1970 and 1990 is that property
crime victimization has become increasingly concentrated
on the poor.
As pointed out by many authors, the fact that police
reduces crime is far from being demonstrated. Realizing
that (at least in the U.S.A.) the number of police officers
increases mostly in election years, Levitt [14] has studied
the correlation between these variations (uncorrelated to
crime) and variations in crime reduction. He finds that in-
creases in the size of police forces substantially reduce vi-
olent crime, but have a smaller impact on property crime.
Moreover, the social benefit of reducing crime is not larger
than the cost of hiring additional police. Similar conclu-
sions have been drawn by Freeman [15], who estimates
that the overall cost of crime in the US is of the order of 4
percent of the GDP, 2 per cent lost to crime and 2 percent
spent on controlling crime. This amounts to an average of
about 54, 000 dollars/year for each of the 5 million or so
men incarcerated, put on probation or paroled.
In most models, punishment of crime has two distinct
aspects: on one side there is the frequency at which illegal
actions are punished (which corresponds to the punish-
ment probability in the models), and on the other, the
severity of the punishment. In a review paper, Eide [16]
comments that although many empirical studies conclude
that the probability of punishment has a preventive effect
on crime, the results are ambiguous.
More recent reviews of the research literature consider
the factors influencing crime trends [17] and present some
recent modeling of crime and offending in England and
Wales [3]. They both note the above mentioned difficulties
in estimating the parameters of the models and the cost
of crime.
Most of the models in the literature follow Becker’s
economic approach. Ehrlich [9] presents a market model
of crime assuming that individuals decisions are “ratio-
nal”: a person commits an offense if his expected utility
exceeds the utility he could get with legal activities. At
the “equilibrium” between the supply of crimes and the
“demand” (or tolerance) to crime — reflected by the ex-
penditures for protection and law enforcement – neither
criminals, private individuals nor government can expect
to improve their benefits by changing their behaviors. In
particular, the model is based on standard assumptions
in economic models, with “well behaved” monotonic sup-
ply and demand curves, which cannot explain situations
where social interactions are important [18,19]. Indeed,
Glaeser et al [20] attribute to social interactions the large
variance in crime on different cities of the US.
Another kind of models [21,3] treat criminality as an
epidemics problem, which spreads over the population due
to contact of would-be criminals with “true” criminals
(who have already committed crime). This kind of mod-
els incorporates effects due to social interactions, which
introduce large nonlinearities in the level of crime asso-
ciated to different combinations of the parameters. These
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may explain the wide differences reported in the empirical
literature.
In this paper we focus on economic crimes, where the
criminal agents try to obtain an economic advantage by
means of the accomplished felony. No physical aggression
or death of the victim will be considered, and on the side
of punishment we consider the standard of most devel-
oped civilized countries, i.e. fines and imprisonment. We
assume that [22] “most criminal acts are not undertaken
by deviant psychopathic individuals, but are more likely to
be carried out by ordinary people reacting to a particu-
lar situation with a unique economic, social, environmen-
tal, cultural, spatial and temporal context. It is these re-
actionary responses to the opportunities for crime which
attract more and more people to become involved in crim-
inal activities rather than entrenched delinquency”.
We simulate a population of heterogeneous individu-
als. They earn different wages, have different tastes for
criminality, and modify their behaviors according to the
risk of punishment. We assume that both the probabil-
ity and the severity of the punishment increase with the
magnitude of the crime. We are interested in the conse-
quences of the punishment policy on the costs of crime,
in the wealth distribution consistent with different levels
of criminality, in the economic growth of the society as a
function of time, and in the (possibly bad) consequences
of allowing for some criminal activity in order to minimize
the cost of the law enforcement apparatus. In section 2 we
describe the model, in section 3 we explain its dynamics.
We present the results of the simulations in 4 and leave
the conclusions to section 5
2 Description of the model
We consider a model of society with a constant number
of agents, N , who perceive a periodic (monthly) positive
income Wi (that we call wage), spend part of it each
month and earns the rest. Wages remain constant dur-
ing the simulated period. In our simulations, the wages
distribution has a finite support: Wi ∈ [Wmin,Wmax]. In
this utopian society there is not unemployment, and it is
assumed that the minimum wage is enough to provide for
the minimum needs of each agent, i.e. a person perceiving
the minimum wage will expend it completely within the
month. These wages and possibly the booties of success-
fully realized crimes constitute the only income source of
the individuals. Besides the living expenses, capitals may
decrease due to plunders and to the taxes or fines related
to conviction, as explained later.
We assume that each agent has an inclination to abide
by the law, that is represented by a honesty index Hi (i ∈
[1, N ]) which, at the beginning of the simulations ranges
between a minimum and a maximum: Hi ∈ [Hmin, Hmax].
This inclination — that may be psychological, ethical, or
reflect educational level and/or socio-economical environ-
ment — is not an intrinsic characteristic of the individuals.
It changes from month to month according to the risk of
apprehension upon performing a crime.
In our simulations, the individual decision of commit-
ting a crime depends (not exclusively) on both the hon-
esty index and the monthly income, which are initially
drawn at random from distributions pH and pW respec-
tively, without any correlation among them. This is justi-
fied by the lack of empirical evidence that the poorer are
more or less law abiders than the rich.
The honesty index of all the individuals but the crimi-
nal increases by a small amount each time a crime is pun-
ished. Otherwise it decreases, but at a different rate for the
criminal than for the rest of the population. The honesty
index is not affected by the importance of the punishment.
This assumption is an extreme simplification of the obser-
vation [6] that the crime rate is more sensitive to the risk
of apprehension than to the severity of punishment. We
have studied different distributions pH and pW and differ-
ent treatments of the honesty index. The latter differ in
the way we treat the lower bound of the distribution pH ,
namely Hmin. Hereafter we describe in details the sim-
plest case: we consider that Hmin is an absolute minimum
of the honesty. Hmin corresponds thus to the honesty in-
dex of the most recalcitrant offenders. But we also add
the hypothesis (that is certainly controversial) that for
those agents with this lowest honesty there is no possible
redemption, i.e. when the honesty index of an agent de-
creases down to Hmin it remains there for ever. We leave
to forthcoming discussions the possible variations of this
scheme.
As a consequence of this treatment, there are intrinsic
criminals (those with Hi = Hmin). Indeed, a finite frac-
tion, NC(0), of intrinsically criminal agents is assumed
from the very beginning of the simulation, according with
the idea that there always have been and will be a finite
number of not redemptible criminals in a society. All the
N − NC(0) other agents are “susceptible”: their degree
of honesty Hi(0), drawn at random from the probability
distribution pH , satisfies Hmin < Hi(0) ≤ Hmax.
Individuals have also “social” connections: encounters
between criminals and victims may only occur between so-
cially linked individuals. These connections are not meant
to represent social closeness but rather the fact that those
individuals share common daily trajectories or live in close
neighborhoods, or meet each other just by chance. For
simplicity, here we consider the latter situation: every in-
dividual may be connected to every other individual.
Notice that the nature of social interactions in our
model is very different from the mimetic interactions con-
sidered by Glaeser et al [20], or the social pressure in-
troduced by Campbell et al. [21]. We study just the case
of individual crimes. No illicit criminal associations (“maf-
fia”) nor collective victims (like in bank assaults) are going
to be considered.
The characteristics of the simulated population evolve
on time. We assume that every month there is a number
of possible criminal attempts. This number depends on
the honesty index of the population as is explained later.
Among these attempts, some are successful, i.e. the crimi-
nal spoils his victim of a (random) fraction of his earnings.
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In contrast with most models, crimes are punished
with a probability that depends on the magnitude of the
loot. When punished, the criminal returns part of the
booty to the victim, pays a fine that may be considered as
a contribution to the public enforcement system and goes
to jail for a number of months that also depends on the
stolen amount. Maintaining each criminal in prison bears
a fixed cost per month to the society, that we evaluate.
In our simulations we study the month to month evo-
lution of different quantities that characterize the system,
and how these depend on the probability of punishment.
3 Monthly dynamics
Starting from initial conditions of honesty, wages and earn-
ings described in section 3.1, we simulate the model for a
fixed number of months. Within each month, there is a
random number of criminal attempts correlated with the
honesty level of the population (section 3.2). However, not
all the attempts end up with a crime: the potential crimi-
nal has to satisfy some reasonable conditions that we ex-
plicit in section 3.3. If there is crime, there is a transfer
of the stolen value from the victim to the criminal, as de-
tailed in section 3.4. Some of the offenders are detected
and punished (section 3.5): part of the stolen amount is
then returned to the victim and a fine or tax is levied from
the criminal’s earnings. In turn, the honesty of the pop-
ulation evolves after each crime, according to the success
or failure in crime repression (section 3.6).
We keep track of the individuals’ wealth, taking into
account the monthly incomes, the living expenses, the
plunders, and the cost of imprisonment, as detailed in sec-
tion 3.7.
In the following paragraphs we describe in details the
dynamics of the model.
3.1 Initial conditions
The individuals have initial honesty indexes Hi(0) and
wages Wi drawn with uncorrelated probability density
functions (pdf) pH and pW respectively. We assume that
the majority of the population is honest and also that the
majority earn low salaries, i.e. pH has a maximum at large
H while pW has its maximum at small W . The results de-
scribed below have been obtained considering triangular
distributions, because they are the simplest way of in-
troducing the desired individual inhomogeneities. Thus,
pW is a triangular distribution of wages, with Wmin = 1
and Wmax = 100 (in some arbitrary monetary unit), with
its maximum at Wmin and a mean value W = Wmin +
(Wmax −Wmin)/3. As already explained, there is an ini-
tial number of “intrinsic” criminals NC(0) drawn at ran-
dom, with Hi = Hmin. In our simulations this number has
been set to 5% of the population (NC(0) = 0.05N). The
honesty index of the remaining (susceptible) individuals
is triangular, from Hmin = 0 up to Hmax = 100, with the
maximum at Hmax.
Individuals’ initial endowments are arbitrarily set to
five months wages: Ki(0) = 5Wi. This initial amount con-
trols the time needed for the dynamics to fully develop.
Smaller initial endowments result in transients dominated
by the size of the possible loots, because these cannot ex-
ceed the victims’ capitals.
3.2 Attempts
The number of criminal attempts each monthm isA(m) =
[A(m)] where [. . . ] represents the integer part, and
A(m) =

1 + r(m) cAN+
Hmax(m)−H(m)
H(m)
NC(m)
ifH(m) 6= Hmin ,
1 + r(m) cAN+ 2NC(m)
ifH(m) = Hmin .
(1)
r(m) ∈ [0, 1] is a random number drawn afresh each month,
0 < cA < 1 is a coefficient (in the simulations cA = 0.01)
and NC(m) are the number of intrinsic offenders (who
have Hi = 0) at month m. With these considerations there
is always a ground level of criminal attempts given by the
term proportional to N . Criminality increases with the
number of intrinsic offenders and with a decreasing aver-
age honesty. When the latter equals Hmin all the popu-
lation has the minimum of honesty, i.e. everybody is an
“intrinsic” offender. In this case, to avoid the divergence
in the first of equations (1), the prefactor of NC was set
arbitrarily to 2.
At each criminal attempt a potential offender is se-
lected as explained in subsection 3.3 and the number of
remaining attempts for the month is decreased by one,
even if the crime is aborted.
3.3 Criminals
We consider that the possible criminals have low honesty
indexes, and that it is more likely that they have low
wages. Then, at each attempt, a potential criminal k is
drawn at random among the population of free (not im-
prisoned) individuals (we discuss in 3.5 when and how long
punished offenders go in jail). We also select at random
an upper bound HU to the honesty index in the interval
[Hmin, Hmax]. If
Hk < HU , (2)
then the offense takes place with a probability:
pk = e−Wk/W , (3)
that is higher the lower the potential criminal wages. Thus,
we select a random number in [0, 1). If it is larger than pk,
the criminal attempt is aborted.
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3.4 Crime
If crime is actually committed, a victim v among the so-
cial neighbors (not in jail) of k is selected at random. We
do not take into account the wealth of the victim, which
may be an important incentive for the criminal’s decision.
Thus, our treatment may be adequate for minor larcenies,
like stealing in public transportation. In the crimes con-
sidered in this paper, the victim is robbed of a random
amount S that cannot be larger than his actual capital.
In the simulation, this amount is proportional to the vic-
tim’s wage:
S = rS cSWv, (4)
where rS ∈ [0, 1] is a random number drawn afresh at
each attempt and cS > 0 is a coefficient (here we use
cS = 10, implying that robbery may concern amounts up
to 10 times the victim’s wage). If the value given by (4)
is larger than the victim’s capital Kv, we set S = Kv.
Correspondingly, the victim’s capital is decreased by the
stolen amount, to become Kv − S while the criminal’s
capital is in turn increased to Kk + S.
3.5 Punishment
The criminal may be catched and punished with proba-
bility
pi(S) =
p1
1 + p1−p0p0 e
− S
K(m)
, (5)
a monotonic function that starts at its minimal value p0
(for S = 0 ), increases almost linearly with S for values of
S smaller than ≈ K(m), the population’s average wealth,
and gets close to the asymptotic value p1 for large booties.
A punished criminal is imprisoned for a number of
months 1+[S/W ] (the square brackets mean integer part),
i.e. proportional to the stolen amount. During this time
he does not earn his monthly wage and cannot be selected
as a potential offender nor as a victim.
Beyond incarceration, the convicted criminal suffers a
financial loss. He is deprived of an amount (fR + fD)S,
larger than the loot but that cannot exceed his total wealth
(we do not allow for negative capitals). It is worth to re-
mark that the financial loss is not limited to reimburse the
stolen capital. A monetary punishment (a fine) is inflicted
to the offender together with the time in prison (that rep-
resents, in addition to be incarcerated, also a monetary
loss). The total amount deduced from the offender’s cap-
ital is composed of a fraction fRS (with fR < 1), that is
returned to the victim, and an amount, fDS (or Kk−fRS
if fDS > Kk), considered as a duty. Cumulated duties or
“taxes” constitute the total income of fines. In this simu-
lation fR = 0.75 and fD = 0.45, meaning that both crimi-
nals and victims contribute to taxes, since the victims only
recover a fraction 1 − fR of the stolen amount. However,
with the assumed values of fR and fD, fR + fD = 1.2,
implying that the criminals also afford part of the costs.
3.6 Honesty dynamics
We assume that punishment has a dissuasive effect on
the population, although not necessarily on the convict.
Thus, whenever a criminal is convicted, the honesty in-
dex of all the population but the criminal, is increased
by a fixed amount δH. Convicted criminals do not change
their honesty level. On the contrary, when the crime is not
punished, the entire population but the criminal decrease
their honesty index by δH, while the criminal decreases his
by 2δH: unpunished criminals become even less honest.
In the present simulations we do not allow Hi to be-
come negative. Moreover, the lower bound of the distribu-
tion is absorbing. Thus, individuals reaching Hi = Hmin
have their honesty index freezed, and henceforth are con-
sidered as “intrinsic” criminals.
A dynamics with a non-absorbing bound for the hon-
esty dynamics gives similar results to those presented here.
A variant that we did not implement yet is to modify the
honesty level of the criminal proportionally to the impor-
tance of the loot.
3.7 Monthly earnings and costs
At the end of each month m, after the A(m) criminal
attempts are completed, the individuals’ cumulated cap-
itals Ki(m) are updated: the total capital of each agent,
Ki(m), is increased with his salary and decreased with
his monthly expenses. Notice that the criminals’ and the
victims’ capitals have been further modified during the
month, according to the results of the criminal attempts.
We assume that individuals need an amount Wmin +
f × (Wi −Wmin) with f < 1 to cover their monthly ex-
penses. Thus, individuals with higher wages spend a pro-
portional part of their income in addition to the mini-
mum wage Wmin. This is a simplifying assumption which
may be questionable since the richer the individuals, the
smaller the fraction of income they need for living but, on
the other hand, rich people spent more in luxury goods.
Assuming a more involved model for the expenses would
modify the monthly wealth distribution, making it more
unequal, but we do not expect that the qualitative results
of our simulations would be modified.
In order to quantify the expenditure of conviction and
imprisonment, we assume that the monthly cost of main-
taining a criminal in jail is equal to the minimal wage.
This is clearly a too simple hypothesis, that does not take
into account the fixed costs of maintaining the public en-
forcement against crime. It is just a mean of assessing
some social cost proportional to the criminal activity. The
cumulated taxes, obtained through punishment of con-
victed criminals are thus decreased by an amount Wmin
per month for each convict in jail.
At the end of each month, the time that inmates have
to remain in prison (excluding the criminals convicted dur-
ing that month) is decreased by one; those having com-
pleted their arrest punishment are freed.
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4 Simulation results
Starting with the initial conditions, there are A(m) crimi-
nal attempts each month m as described in the subsection
3.2. As a consequence of the criminal activity, during the
month the capitals of criminals and victims are modified,
as well as the honesty index of the population. With the
above dynamics, the earnings and the honesty distribu-
tions are shifted and distorted. The system may even con-
verge to a population where all the initially susceptible
individuals end up as intrinsically criminal.
We simulated systems of N = 1 000 agents for a pe-
riod of 240 months, under different distributions of hon-
esty and wages. Here we report results corresponding to
the triangular distributions described in section 2: wages
have a linearly decreasing distribution in [Wmin,Wmax]
with Wmin = 1 and Wmax = 100: there are more individ-
uals with low wages than with high ones. The honesty dis-
tribution is also triangular, but increasing: starting with
pH(Hmin) = 0, it increases linearly reaching its maximum
at pH(Hmax), which corresponds to assuming that there
are more honest than dishonest individuals.
4.1 Evolution of criminality with time
The system’s evolution is very sensitive to the punishment
probability. Generally, the first months the rate of crime
is low because the number of intrinsic criminals is small
and the stolen amounts cannot be larger than the initial
endowments. But after some months (the number depends
on the initial conditions and on the values of p0 and p1)
the crime rate increases to a stationary value.
Figure 1 shows a typical monthly evolution of the num-
ber of attempts, the number of crimes, the number of con-
victed criminals (which are the criminals punished in the
corresponding month) and of inmates. The left figure cor-
responds to relatively low values of both p0 (the probabil-
ity of punishing small offenses) and p1 (the probability of
punishing large offenses) in (5). Beyond about 75 months
the number of attempts increases through an avalanche
to reach its saturation value, while the number of inmates
grows to reach almost all the population, producing a drop
in crime. This drop is not due to a deterrent effect of pun-
ishment but rather to the absence of possible criminals
(they are all in jail). Eventually the system evolves to a
smaller number of inmates, but the population is essen-
tially composed of individuals with the smallest honesty
index: the punishment rate is not enough to keep criminal-
ity below any acceptable level. The figure on the right (see
the change in the ordinate scale) corresponds to a slightly
higher value of p1, showing the impressive impact of in-
creasing the probability of punishment of big offenses. All
the quantities (attempts, crimes, etc.) present a dramatic
decrease with respect to the values in the left hand side
figure. Notice that the fluctuations on the reported quan-
tities are of the same order of magnitude in both figures:
they are due to the probabilistic nature of the quantities
involved (see equations (1) to (5) ).
Correspondingly, the earned capital per individual (fig-
ure 2 upper left) increases almost linearly with time when
crime is limited. In contrast, in the highly criminal soci-
ety (p1 = 0.5) it begins to decrease as soon as the regime
of high criminality is reached, mainly because most crimi-
nals are convicted and do not receive their wages, but also
because, since the number of punished crimes is also high,
the amount retained in the form of taxes is discounted
from the total wealth of the society. Moreover, the high
cost of imprisonment, proportional to the total number of
inmates, drains also part of the capital and contributes to
decrease the capital per capita. This is illustrated on figure
2 upper right, where the total capital per agent is decom-
posed into the capital hold by the intrinsic criminals and
the part hold by the susceptible population (with honesty
index Hi > 0). When the system reaches the high crim-
inality regime the latter drops to zero because there are
no more susceptible individuals. Clearly, when the level of
punishment is not high enough to guarantee an effective
control of criminality, the cost of the repressive system is
very high. It is remarkable that a very small increase of
the upper value p1 in (5) is enough for a complete change
in the scenario.
The lower figure 2 presents the evolution of the Gini
index of the population, defined by:
G =
∑N−1
j=1
∑N
i=j+1 |Ki −Kj |
(N − 1)∑Ni Ki . (6)
The Gini index spans in the interval [0, 1] and measures
the inequality in the wealth distribution of the popula-
tion. Its minimal value, G = 0, corresponds to a perfectly
equalitarian society. The Gini index of the initial endow-
ment, distributed according with a triangular probabil-
ity density, is G(0) = 0.4. Due to the dynamics, when
crime level is moderate (p1 = 0.6) G is seen to slightly in-
crease. However, in the high criminality regime (p1 = 0.5)
it oscillates, and when the high crime rate sets in, it first
plummets down because successful criminals, mostly indi-
viduals with small incomes according to the probability of
crime (3), increase their wealths at the victims’ expense.
As a result, the wealth distribution becomes more evenly
distributed. However, on the long run, the Gini index in-
creases dramatically. This is so because if everybody is a
lawbreaker (lowest honesty index) criminals and victims
are the same, just one stealing the other. So when one
agent is in the victim role he becomes poor because of the
robbery, and when he behaves as a crook he also finishes
poor (generally), mainly because he pays taxes and also
does not earn his wage when in jail. So, just a few agents
are able to hold large capitals thanks to crime, increasing
inequality in this society.
In fact, when p0 is smaller than a critical value of
the order of 0.5, on increasing p1, the system presents
an abrupt transition between a high crime — low honesty
population to a low crime — high honesty one. This tran-
sition, apparent on all the quantities, as may be seen below
on figure 3, corresponds to a swing of the system between
a regime of high criminality to one where the criminality
level is moderately low.
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Fig. 1. Statistics of criminality per month. Attempts: number of criminal attempts in the month. Crimes: number of crimes
committed in the month. Convicted: number of criminals punished in the month. Inmates: number of criminals in jail. The
difference between the left (a) and the right (b) panels is the maximum punishment probability p1, p1 = 0.5 in the left panel
and p1 = 0.6 in the right panel. Therefore, a small change in the probability of punishment induce a enormous change in the
criminality (see the difference in scale in the ordinate axis).
In the high criminality side, cumulated earnings are
small, taxes are high and the Gini index is large. Con-
versely, on the low criminality side, i.e. for sufficiently high
p1, the cumulated wealth increases monthly according to
the earned wages, and the Gini index reflects the distri-
bution of the latter. We will show in Figures 4, below,
typical histograms of wealth distribution at both sides of
the transition, as well as the initial distribution.
4.2 Changing the punishment probability
In the previous section we have discussed the time evolu-
tion of criminality. Let’s now consider the final state of the
society (after 240 months) as a function of the probability
of punishment. In order to make comparable experiments
we have studied societies with the same initial conditions
subjected to different levels of punishment. Notice that
these levels are constant during the simulated 240 months.
We consider different values of p0 smaller than a crit-
ical value of the order of 0.5, and we study the variation
of several social indicators as a function of p1. We observe
that the system ends up with either a high crime-low hon-
esty population (for p1 lower than a critical value) or a low
crime-high honesty one. This transition, apparent on all
the quantities, as may be seen on figures 3, corresponds to
a swing of the system between a regime of high criminality
to one of moderate criminality.
In the upper left panel of Figs. 3 the number of crimes
and punishments per agent is represented for three repre-
sentative values of p0: 0.1, 0.3 and 0.4. There is a sharp
transition in the criminality when p1 increases but the crit-
ical value strongly depends on the value of p0. While for
p0 = 0.4 the transition happens for p1 ' 0.52, for p0 = 0.1
the critical value grows up to p1 = 0.65. This is an indica-
tion that the permissiveness in coping with small crimes
have a deleterious effect, since the probability of punish-
ment needed to deter important crimes increases.
A simple argument allows to understand the abrupt
transition found in the simulations, which is correlated
with a drop in the honesty level of the population. The
average honesty level of the population increases roughly
(we neglect the influence of criminal’s different dynamics)
by about δH if crimes are punished, and decreases by the
same amount if not punished. Thus, we expect: H¯(m +
1) ≈ H¯(m) + (1 − pi)δH − piδH per crime, where pi is
the probability of the crime being punished. Clearly, there
should be a change from an increasing honesty dynamics
to a decresaing one for pi = 1/2. If crimes were punished
with the same probability whatever the value of the loot
(p0 = p1), the change in the honesty dynamics would arise
when this probability is equal to 1/2. If small crimes have
less probability of punishment, p0 < 1/2, then p1 must
increase to keep the same dynamics on the average.
The upper right panel shows the total capital of the so-
ciety. The effect of wrongdoing is evident. From a strictly
economic point of view the worse situation arises closely
below the critical point: a high level of criminal actions
together with a relatively high frequency of punishment
(although not enough to control criminality) have as a
consequence a strong decrease in the total capital (because
the cumulated effect of booties and taxes strongly reduces
the total capital of the population). On the other hand,
once the delinquency is under control the total capital of
the society arrives to a maximum level.
The opposite effect is observed in the plot of the booties
and taxes (left low panel). They are very high in the high
criminality region (low values of p1) and decrease strongly
when p1 is above its critical value.
Finally in the right low panel we have represented the
Gini coefficient. If we observe this figure together with the
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Fig. 2. Capital and Gini monthly statistics: panel (a) shows the cumulated capital per agent as a function of time (the black
curve corresponds to p1 = 0.5 and the red one to p1 = 0.6), panel (b) shows the participation in the total capital of intrinsic
criminals (blue line) and susceptible ones (green line) just for the case of high criminality, p1 = 0.5; panel (c) shows the Gini
coefficient for two values of p1, as in panel (a).
evolution of the wealth of the society we can conclude that
low criminality implies higher economic growth and less
inequality. As the Gini coefficient is an average indicator,
we present in Fig. 4 the wealth distribution histograms,
in order to supply a complementary indicator. The two
panels on top of Fig. 4 correspond to the histograms for
the two values of p0 and p1 used on figures 1 and 2. It is
clear that, for p1 = 0.5, more than half of the agents have
a vanishingly small capital, so explaining the high value
of the Gini coefficient, while the total wealth of the popu-
lation (represented by the total area of the histogram) is
smaller that in the case of larger p1. On the other hand, for
p1 = 0.6 the number of agents with wealth near zero falls
down to 10% of the population. Finally and just for com-
parison the lower figure represents the wealth distribution
for the initial state (or, equivalently, the wages distribu-
tion).
We would like to emphasize that the results presented
in this section are averages over 100 independent samples
at the end of 240 months of evolution. We expect that
modifying either p0 or p1 or both as a function of time
(as it may happen in real societies in order to correct an
abnormal increase of criminality) would produce different
results because the initial conditions before the change in
the probabilities are different (recall that here we assume
a low initial number of low honesty agents). In fact if one
starts in a state of high criminality, a very high probabil-
ity of punishment (much higher than the critical values
here presented) should be needed in order to reduce the
criminality back to acceptable levels. Once more, preven-
tive actions should be less expensive and easier to apply
than trying to recover from a very deteriorated security
situation.
5 Discussion and conclusion
A central hypothesis of our model is that the honesty level
of the population is correlated with the mere existence
(or absence) of punishment, but not with its importance
(which is proportional to the size of the loot). Thus, pun-
ishing small crimes is as effective as punishing large ones
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Fig. 3. Panel (a): average number of crimes and convicted criminals over the simulated period. Panel (b): last month capital
per capita of the population. Panel (c): average loot (full symbols) and taxes (empty symbols). Panel (d): last month Gini index.
for increasing the population’s honesty globally: the hon-
esty level increases when crimes are punished and, on the
contrary, impunity decreases it. Since small larcenies have
a lower probability of being punished than large loots, the
public effort on crime deterrence depends on the impor-
tance of the crime through the probability of punishment.
In Fig. 5 we represented the honesty distribution for
the case p0 = 0.3 and p1 = 0.6 (panel (b)) and, for com-
parison, the initial distribution (panel (a)). We have not
represented the case p1 = 0.5 because in that case the
honesty index of the entire population drops to zero, as
discussed above: p1 is not large enough and the criminality
level of the population is the highest.
Beyond those results, our model shows an interesting
abrupt drop of the criminality level beyond a critical value
of p1, that depends on p0, whenever p0 < 0.5. When small
larcenies have a high probability of being punished, the
value of p1 needed to reduce crime is smaller.
We remark that this behavior is very general, indepen-
dent of the detailed parameters of the simulation, as we
have shown using a general argument in section 4.2
On the other hand, the drop in criminality has very
positive consequences: increase of the global earnings be-
cause taxes decrease, and stabilization of the inequality at
the level corresponding to the differences in wages.
So, to conclude, we have presented a simple model of
crime and punishment that stands on the assumption that
punishment has a deterrent effect on criminality. Our main
result is that tolerance with respect to small felonies (small
value of p0) has a global negative consequence because it
requires bigger efforts to cope with important crimes in
order to keep a given level of honesty. We also observe
an avalanche effect since a small change in the proba-
bility of punishment may reduce or increase the average
criminality in a very significative way. Also, the economic
consequences of criminality are remarkable, both in the
observed total wealth of the population, as well as in the
measure of wealth inequality.
A less crude model should also include the effect of a
particular treatment (or not) of recidivism. This is a point
of discussion in countries like France, where some legisla-
tors ask for a minimum sentence for relapse. Also, one
should be more careful in treating more “sophisticated”
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Fig. 4. Histograms of the population wealth. Upper figures: at the end of the 240 months with p1 = 0.5 (a) and p1 = 0.6 (b).
Lower figure (c): initial state.
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Fig. 5. Histograms of the population’s honesty index. (a) initial distribution, where the small peak at zero honesty corresponds
to the initial 5% concentration of intrinsic criminals. (b) final distribution for p0 = 0.3 and p1 = 0.6: more than half of the
population exhibits a honesty index ≥ 100 while the number of intrinsic criminals remains the initial one. For p0 = 0.3 and
p1 = 0.5 the honesty index of all the agents drops down to zero (and for this reason the plot is not included): a small change in
the probability of punishment clearly induces a big change in the average honesty of the population.
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criminality, like organized crime, or criminals that choose
the victim according to the expected loot. It would be in-
teresting to analyze the effect of imprisonment: either to
recover or to increase the inmates criminal tendencies. We
are presently working on these points, which are of great
importance.
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